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The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of New Public Management (NPM) 
reforms, in the form of the key performance indicator system PSV (police management tool), 
on employees in the Norwegian police force, and to, based on the study’s findings, make 
recommendations for the further development of the PSV system. A bottom-up thematic 
analysis of interviews with police employees resulted in a nine factor model describing how 
the PSV system is perceived by police employees. Results show that the use of PSV is 
associated with several negative side effects. Among these are a shift in focus away from 
actual police tasks to measurement criteria, reduced willingness to cooperate across police 
districts, and counterproductive and unethical behavior. These results echo findings from 
previous international research on NPM’s effects on public sector employees. However, this 
study also found that although critical of the PSV system, employees in the Norwegian police 
are aware of benefits of quantitative performance measurement. The results revealed 
significant differences between employees on different organizational levels, with those on 
higher organizational levels being more aware of the positive effects, while lower-level 
employees were more concerned with the negative.   
Based on the results, the following recommendations were formulated for the further 
development of the PSV system: (1) revise measurement criteria, (2) improve communication 
between upper management and lower level employees, (3) promote focus on task, not 
numbers, and (4) exercise caution in implementing reward systems based on PSV results. 
 
Keywords: new public management, performance management, KPIs, police 
performance, performance measurement.   
MEASURING POLICE PERFORMANCE  
6 
 
Measuring Police Performance: Exploring the use of New Public Management 
Techniques in the Norwegian Police Service 
In July 2013, a committee appointed by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security issued a report on the current state of the Norwegian police service. The aim of the 
report was to analyze the challenges facing the Norwegian police, and to suggest measures to 
improve problem solving and resource use in the police organization (NOU 2013:9). Among 
the suggested measures were increased flexibility, increased accountability through key 
performance indicators and an action plan for responding to failure to achieve organizational 
goals. These are all typical features of the management paradigm New Public Management. 
The suggestions in the report hence seem to be based on the assumption that New Public 
Management is the most effective form of public sector management. However, international 
research has documented several adverse effects of New Public Management in many areas of 
the public sector, including the police organization. On this background, the aim of this thesis 
is to assess the effects of New Public Management implementation in the Norwegian police, 
as perceived by police employees themselves. 
 
New Public Management 
New Public Management (hereafter NPM) can be described as a set of management 
techniques based on private sector practice, applied in public sector organizations (Lapsley, 
2009).  There are several descriptions and definitions of what components NPM consists of, 
the essence being ‘managers, markets and measurement’ (Butterfield, Edwards & Woodall, 
2005). One of the most widely cited articles in the public sector literature points to seven key 
elements, or doctrines, of NPM (table 1). The doctrines somewhat overlap and are not fully 
consistent (Hood, 1991). For instance, detailed performance management systems intended to 
help managers monitor and control the professionals, conflict with the private-sector practices 
such as devolution and flexibility (Hoggett, 1996). Such doctrinal inconsistencies occur 
because NPM is a collective term for a set of management techniques, rather than one 
homogenous reform programme (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001).  
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Table 1. Doctrinal components of NPM (Hood, 1991) 
Doctrine Meaning Typical justification 
1. Hands-on professional 
management. 
Active, visible, discretionary 
control of organizations from 
named persons at the top, ‘free to 
manage’. 
Accountability requires clear 
assignment of responsibility 
for action, not diffusion of 
power.  
2. Explicit standards and 
measures of 
performance. 
Definitions of goals, targets, 
indicators of success, preferably 
expressed in quantitative terms, 
especially for professional 
services. 
Accountability requires clear 
statement of goals; efficiency 
requires ‘hard look’ 
perspectives.  
3. Greater emphasis on 
output controls. 
Resource allocation and reward 
linked to measured performance; 
breakup of centralized 
bureaucracy-wide personnel 
management. 
Need to stress results rather 
than procedures. 
4. Shift to disaggregation 
of units.  
 
 
Breakup of formerly ‘monolithic’ 
units, unbundling of U-form 
management systems into 
corporatized units around 
products, operating on 
decentralized ‘one-line’ budgets 
and dealing with one another on 
an ‘arms-length’ basis. 
Need to create ‘manageable’ 
units, separate provision and 
productivity interests, gain 
efficiency advantages of use 
of contract or franchise 
arrangements inside as well 
as outside the public sector. 
5. Shift to greater 
competition. 
Move to term contracts and public 
tendering procedures. 
Rivalry as the key to lower 
costs and better standards. 
6. Stress on private 
sector styles of 
management practice. 
Move away from military-style 
‘public service ethic’, greater 
flexibility in hiring and rewards; 
greater use of PR techniques. 
Need to use ‘proven’ private 
sector management tools in 
the public sector. 
7. Stress on greater 
discipline and parsimony 
in resource use. 
Cutting direct costs, raising labour 
discipline, resisting union 
demands, limiting ‘compliance 
costs’ to business. 
Need to check resource 
demands of public sector and 
‘to more with less’. 
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Historical and theoretical foundation 
The NPM movement began with the implementation of certain management 
techniques in several European countries and the USA in the 1980’s. These reforms took 
place relatively independently of each other; only later did academics bring attention to the 
fact that the reforms had common characteristics, and collectively identify them as ‘New 
Public Management’ (Gruening, 2001). Although NPM as it is described here rose in the late 
1970’s to early 1980’s, it contains features stemming from older traditions and perspectives 
on public administration. Gruening (2001) gives a comprehensive overview of the 
contributors to NPM’s theoretical foundation. Among these are public-choice theory, rational 
public management, and the neo-Austrian school, with its ideas of privatizations and budget 
cuts. NPM is also influenced by rationally oriented management scholars like Ostrom and 
Drucker, whereof the latter is especially known for the concept of management by objectives, 
a management strategy of aligning organizational operations with overarching goals (Drucker, 
1995, 2012) Other features of NPM, such as performance management and rationalization of 
administrative structures, can trace its origin back even further, to the school of classical 
public management originating among others in Taylor and Weber’s scientific management in 
the early 1900’s. Hence, when NPM emerged, the basic concepts of the paradigm were not 
new in themselves, but combining them in the way NPM does, was (Gruening, 2001).  
 
Antecedents of NPM 
NPM began to take form in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, with UK, Australia and 
New Zealand as pacesetters (Hood, 1991; Lapsley, 2009), and has since been adopted by 
many Western European and North American countries (Pollitt, 1995).  Although the 
modernization of the public sector in OECD countries has had many similarities, there are 
national differences in the degree and nature of NPM implementation (Schedler & Proeller, 
2010). All seven elements presented in table 1 are not equally present in all countries or in all 
parts of the public sector, but it is argued that many OECD countries will be exposed to some 
extent by most of them (Hood, 1991). The differences in exposure to the different paradigms 
lead to differences in NPM practices. For example, the emphasis in Scandinavia has been 
more on performance management, while it in the US, the UK and New Zealand has been 
focused more on contractualization of the public services and the improvement of service 
quality (Pollitt, 1995).  Internationally, NPM was implemented somewhat later in the police 
service than in other parts of the public sector, carrying with it structural changes similar to 
those in other public sector organizations: organizational de-layering, decentralization and 
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devolution of operational responsibilities, and control and accountability through key 
performance indicators and strategic objectives (Butterfield et al., 2005).  
Several societal and economical factors in the late 20th and early 21th century are 
thought to have contributed to the popularity of NPM. Among these are the liberalization of 
the Eastern Block, the impact of large international corporations such as Microsoft and IBM, 
the emergence of China and India as major producers and markets (Lapsley, 2009), as well as 
the 1980’s recession in several western countries (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001). 
Globalization weakened economic management from a national perspective, thereby making 
policy makers eager for a more efficient public sector – as is a main purpose of NPM (Lapsley 
2008; Lapsely 2009). This view that NPM is attractive to the public sector because it is a tool 
to improve performance, takes a technical-rational perspective on management (Hoque, 
Arends & Alexander, 2004). However, research indicates that the technical-rational theories 
alone cannot explain the motives to use NPM (Feldman and March, 1981; March and Olsen, 
1989). An alternative, or rather complementary, theoretical framework for explaining the 
popularity of NPM is legitimacy theory. From this perspective, NPM is applied not to achieve 
efficiency, but in order for the public sector organization to legitimize itself to external 
institutional factors such as electorate, citizens, government and media (Broadbent and 
Guthrie, 1992; Deegan, 2002; Lapsley, 1999). The organization’s need to legitimize its 
practices can stem from both direct and indirect external pressures and from internal 
uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In the case of internal uncertainty, implementation 
of NPM is thought to be an attempt to model or imitate other public sector organizations that 
are perceived to be legitimate (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Hoque et al., 2004). The 
technical-rational and legitimacy perspectives are complementary, and to combine them 
enables a more holistic approach to understanding the appeal of NPM to public sector 
organizations (Ansari & Euske, 1987; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Hoque & Hopper, 1994). The 
legitimization aspect might be especially potent in the police service, as this part of the public 
sector is under great public scrutiny. Research have in fact found that features from both the 
technical-rational perspective and legitimacy theory prompted the implementation of NPM in 
the Australian police service (Hoque et al., 2004).  
 
NPM in Norway 
The implementation of NPM practices in Norway began later, and was less prominent, 
than in many other European countries. One reason for this is that Norway at the time of 
NPM’s rise did not have an economic crisis creating pressure for public sector reforms 
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(Christensen & Lægreid, 2001). In addition, Norway has been, and is, characterized by a 
strong belief in an interventionist and planning state with a large, tightly controlled public 
sector. In this sense, the Norwegian work life model is culturally incompatible with the 
international criticism of the public sector (Olsen, 1996, cited in Christensen and Lægreid, 
2001). According to the transformative perspective on administrative reform, the cultural 
norms, traditions and values of political-administrative systems effect the process and effects 
of reform (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001). In Norway, the state and public sector has been 
characterized by a strong state, mutual trust between political and administrative leaders, 
peaceful cooperation, strong workers’ unions, slow changes and a de-emphasis on economic 
factors in civil service. From a transformative perspective, this can explain why NPM reforms 
in Norway were implemented slower, more reluctantly and in a modified version compared to 
other countries (Christensen & Lægreid, 1998; Christensen & Lægreid, 2001). Another 
contributing factor might be that the forceful implementation of reforms is more likely in two-
party political systems, than in multiparty systems such as the Norwegian (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2001). An example of the modified NPM in Norway is the use of management by 
objectives, which has been labeled a “soft” form of NPM contracting, compared to that in for 
example New Zealand (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001).  
NPM in the Norwegian Police. In spite of the above mentioned incompatibilities of 
NPM and the Norwegian public administration, NPM reforms have been implemented in 
several public sector organizations, like the Norwegian school system and health service. 
NPM techniques have also been applied in the Norwegian police service, for example in the 
form of reforms on performance measurement and management (Vatne & Norheim, 2013). A 
noteworthy example of NPM reform in the Norwegian police, is the implementation of the 
Police Management Tool (hereafter PSV)1, a key performance indicator (hereafter KPI) 
system developed by the Norwegian National Police Directorate (hereafter POD) in 2012. 
This will be the focus of this thesis when exploring NPM measures in the Norwegian police. 
PSV. PSV is a computerized system for monitoring police operations and results. It 
was developed as a means to improve management in the Norwegian police, and to enable a 
more knowledge based, rather than incident based, management. The development, headed by 
the Governance and Management Section of POD, started in the fall of 2011. Implementation 
in the police districts started in the spring of 2012. At this time, many of the KPIs included in 
                                                
1 See appendix A for an overview of abbreviations and Norwegian translations of terms used in this thesis. 
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PSV had already been in use in the police districts as performance measurement criteria for 
several years.  
At the core of PSV are 23 KPIs, which all police districts are measured on. These 
include percentage of crimes solved, absence due to illness, number of controlled vehicles and 
number of days spent to complete cases (NOU 2012:14). Special units, such as the National 
Criminal Investigation Service, the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and 
Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime, the International Police Immigration 
Service, and the Central Mobile Police Force use modified versions of PSV where the KPIs 
are adapted to the units’ tasks. The KPIs for police districts were determined partly in 
cooperation between POD and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Other 
measurement criteria were set by the Norwegian government and parliament. Several of the 
measurement criteria predate PSV, and have been measures for quantifying police work in 
Norway for several years prior to the system’s development.  
PSV has three main functions: a planning function for goals and action plans, an 
operational function for logging the district’s operations, and a reporting function for further 
communicating on goals and operation not covered by the standard KPIs (A. Gloppen & B. T. 
Norheim, personal communication, December 16, 2013). 
Planning: Directions for the operations of the Norwegian Police come from several 
sources. Instructions from POD, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the government all 
impact the management of the police districts. A central feature of PSV’s planning function is 
gathering all such instructions in one place, in order to simplify planning and goal setting. 
PSV thus contains all central documents related to management of the Norwegian police. This 
“rulebook” forms the basis for planning the districts’ operations. With this as the foundation, 
the police districts analyze local challenges and criminal development, in order to set goals for 
the districts’ performance on the different criteria measured by PSV. Goals on some of the 
KPIs are centrally dictated, while most are adapted locally. The districts’ goals are entered 
into PSV, along with risk assessments and action plans for reaching the set goals. Results on 
the KPIs are also entered in PSV, and are available for system users, so that planning and 
analysis can more easily be based on previous results and challenges. To increase 
accountability for results, who is in charge of the different planned measures it is also entered 
into the system. 
After the police districts have entered their goals, and means to reach them, into PSV, 
negotiations with POD follow. Representatives of the police district, typically the police chief 
and other personnel he or she chooses, meet with representatives from POD to discuss the 
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districts plans. Through negotiations with POD, the final action plans and KPI goals for the 
district are determined. One object for POD in this process, is to encourage the police district 
to set ambitious goals on target areas (A. Gloppen & B. T. Norheim, personal communication, 
December 16, 2013).  
Operational. This part of PSV has the same structure as the planning function, 
showing the KPIs, with goals and action plans to obtain them. The operational part of the 
system functions as a work log, where the districts record their operations and 
accomplishments. The districts are required to comment on goals and operations in the 
operational function every four months, but POD recommends that they do so more often, in 
order to monitor their own progress. An important feature of the operational function is that it 
helps monitor connections between applied measures and results. For example, Oslo police 
district used PSV to document changes in occurrence of home invasions when resources was 
allocated to and from this target area (A. Gloppen & B. T. Norheim, personal communication, 
December 16, 2013). Such use of the system allows the police to make more qualified 
assumptions about the effects of different measures.  
Reporting. This part of PSV is for communication on issues not covered by the KPI 
structure in the planning and operational parts of the system. Here, the organization can enter 
or request information on issues such as economy, staff, immigration issues and others. The 
reporting function can be adapted according to the organization’s needs, but as the districts 
are already required to report on a number of KPIs in the planning and operational parts of 
PSV, POD requests that the organization is cautious not to request to much additional 
information in the reporting function (A. Gloppen & B. T. Norheim, personal communication, 
December 16, 2013).  
Further development of PSV. POD is planning further development and alterations to 
PSV over the following years (A. Gloppen & B. T. Norheim, personal communication, 
December 16, 2013). One planned alteration is adding parameters for economy to the already 
existing KPIs. Another goal is to use the PSV’s analytical properties to establish best practice 
routines for dealing with different types of criminality. For example, analysis of the 
connection between results and applied measures directed at for instance burglary, will be 
used to establish routines for what measures to apply in the future to target this issue. POD 
also intends to extend the amount of qualitative reporting – that is, reporting not only on 
numbers and KPIs, but qualitatively on what measures or strategies were applied, and why. 
POD have received feedback from the police districts requesting fewer, more clearly defined 
goals. As a consequence of this, POD is planning to assess and possibly modify the KPIs of 
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PSV. Another intended development to enforce PSV, is to establish a system for punishment 
and reward based on achievement on PSV results. At the same time, POD tries to encourage 
the police districts to set ambitious goals for performance. For the districts, this implies a 
greater risk of not reaching the set goal, than if the goal were set based on what the districts 
expect to attain. Herein lies a possible conflict of interest, as enforcing stricter consequences 
based on PVS results may make the districts more reluctant to set high goals.  
POD also wishes to increase police employees’ awareness of PSV’s properties as not only a 
tool for reporting results to upper management, but as a tool for planning and self-monitoring 
within the districts.  
Future NPM reform. The future appears to hold further NPM reforms for the 
Norwegian police. Investigations in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Norway in July 
2011 revealed several shortcomings in the functioning of the Norwegian police force. In 
response to this, the Norwegian government in March 2012 appointed a committee to assess 
the challenges facing the Norwegian police, and to suggest measures to improve the 
organization’s functioning. The result was a report titled One Police – Prepared to Meet the 
Demands of the Future, issued in July 2013 (NOU 2013:9). The report proposes two major 
reforms of the Norwegian police: a structural reform of the police organization, and a quality 
reform aimed at improving knowledge and effectiveness in the police work. The report 
suggests that the quality reform is achieved through measures such as standardized procedures 
and report systems, increased accountability through KPIs, and action plans for responding to 
failure to achieve organizational goals. More specifically, the suggested reform includes: 
- Improving routines for performance measurement and analysis 
- Establishing KPIs for all of the organization’s core tasks 
- Performing regular comparison of results within the organization 
- Establishing more clearly defined goals, set by management 
- Enforcing consequences for failure to meet organizational goals 
Such techniques are all typical of the NPM tradition, and largely correspond to the 
planned further development of PSV. This indicates that in spite of a slow start, NPM has 
found solid foothold in the administration of the Norwegian police organization.  
 
Effects of NPM  
Although NPM is widely acclaimed and adopted, there have been few large-scale 
evaluations of its effects on organizational outcomes. As Pollitt (1995) points out, it is a 
paradox that while NPM techniques stress the importance of measurable outputs, the outputs 
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of NPM reforms themselves have gone largely unevaluated. The bulk of existing research on 
the topic does however indicate that NPM does not fulfill its promise of efficiency and 
effectiveness in public sector processes and results (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001; Pollitt, 
1995). Meanwhile, large-scale evaluations are few, and there are several methodological 
problems with evaluating the effects of NPM on organizational output (Pollitt, 1995): 
1. NPM reforms are usually multifaceted. Therefore, it is difficult to establish what 
element of the reform caused the observed effect.  
2. At the same time as NPM reforms, there are often other changes in the political or 
administrative environment going on as well. Observed effects may have been caused 
by these changes, not the NPM reforms.  
3. What is the baseline against which one evaluates the outcomes of NPM? The 
organization’s performance before implementing NPM may not be appropriate as a 
baseline, since the performance is likely to have changed over time due to other 
factors, regardless of NPM.  
4. The politico-organizational context must be taken into account. A reform that is 
successful in one context is not necessarily successful in a different context. 
5. It is difficult to define and measure the costs and benefits of NPM programs. 
6. What criteria should be evaluated? Measuring the effects against the stated goals of 
the reform means that the unintended effects go unnoticed. The goals may also prove 
difficult to operationalize.  
An alternative approach to evaluating NPM is to investigate its effects not on organizational 
output, but on the public sector employees themselves. As effects on employees are likely to 
affect both economic results and the service provided to the sector’s clients, this in an 
important area of research from any perspective. Yet, it has received relatively little attention. 
While most research on NPM has focused on either performance results or the management 
process, there has been less research on how NPM impacts the public sector managers and 
professional themselves, and how they carry out their roles (Butterfield et al., 2005). Among 
the studies exploring this topic, some have found that NPM leads to positive outcomes for 
managers and professionals. One study found that NPM techniques allowed middle-managers 
in the UK National Health Service to be more proactive, with better opportunities to plan and 
more control over their staff (Currie & Procter, 2002). Others have found that professionals 
used role expansion and performance management resulting from NPM to enhance their 
professional status (Brooks, 1999; Casey & Allen, 2004).  
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However, adverse effects of NPM have been widely documented. In the UK, the 
implementation of a performance indicator stating that patients should be treated within four 
hours of admission to the accident and emergency unit of hospitals, has allegedly lead to a 
practice of unwillingness to admit patients if they cannot be treated within the appointed 
timeframe (Campbell, 2008). It has been found that centrally dictated targets – a typical NPM 
feature – restrict the autonomy of public sector managers (Currie, 1999; Hoque, Davies & 
Humphries, 2004). Research has also shown that detailed performance indicators can lead to 
inflexibility, goal distortion and data manipulation (Butterfield et al., 2005; Woxholm, 
Holgersson & Dolmén, 2007). In 2012, two criminologists, one of whom a former captain in 
the New York Police Department, published a book on the effects of the management strategy 
Compstat – a typical NPM system based on computerized data, crime analysis, and holding 
middle-management accountable for results (Eterno & Silverman, 2012). The book, based 
among others on surveys with New York police officers, describes a culture of widespread 
data manipulation with serious consequences for both police and citizens. An example from 
closer to home is found in a Swedish study of the police’ work against drug crime The results 
showed that KPIs on “uncovered offences”, lead to manipulation of numbers, for instance by 
reporting cases as drug offences although no drugs had been found on the suspected person 
(Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011). NPM implementation has also been found to spark the 
emergence of subcultures resisting bureaucratic control (Butterfield et al., 2005; Kitchener, 
Kirkpatrick & Whipp, 2000). In the UK, such resistance has become prominent, with several 
UK police forces going as far as to boycott the use of performance indicators (Lapsley, 2009). 
The negative effects of NPM techniques were a main topic of discussion at the UK 2007 
National Police Conference (Lapsley, 2009).  
 Broadening of roles is a well-documented effect of NPM. The role of the professional 
has been found to expand through added features of management, resulting in a hybrid 
“practitioner-manager” role (Adams, Lugsden, Chase, Arber, & Bond, 2000; Casey & Allen, 
2004; Butterfield et al., 2005). Several case studies have also found a tendency for NPM to 
lead to a broadening of the middle-manager role (Butterfield et al., 2005). That is, middle-
managers under NPM have increased responsibilities for managing people, performance, 
finance and business strategy. It is however uncertain to what extent the managers have the 
ability and motivation to deal with this role expansion. Studies indicate that they may lack the 
expertise, motivation, incentives and resources to handle the added responsibilities (Edwards 
& Robinson, 1999, 2001; Hoque et al., 2004). Hence, role expansion has been found to lead to 
role overload, conflict and stress, among others in first line managers in the UK police service 
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(Butterfield et al., 2005; Edwards & Robinson, 1999, 2001). The same study found that 
NPM’s demands for routine monitoring and control of performance indicators lead to police 
sergeants becoming more internally focused, having less contact with their subordinates and 
being less aware of  what was going on “on the ground” (Butterfield et al., 2005). The control 
and performance indicator systems did not lead to better planning or control of subordinates. 
While the sergeants could hold the constables accountable for their results on performance 
indicators, the way these results were achieved was mostly unsupervised. In addition, the 
increased bureaucracy created an environment in which negative subcultures and ‘the 
informal organization’ became highly active. Other research has argued that NPM leads to a 
‘compliance culture’, in which officers feel pressured to meet targets – whether they are 
sensible or not, where serious charges are made against minor trivial acts, and where the focus 
on performance indicators overshadow strategic management (Lapsely, 2009). Some studies 
indicate that senior managers are generally less critical of NPM reforms than employees on 
lower organizational levels (Auditor General of Canada, 1993; Pollitt, 1995). 
There has been less research on the topic on the Scandinavian police service, but the 
results from several Swedish studies echo the findings from international research. The 
findings indicate that NPM performance indicators can be counterproductive, because they 
lead to a focus on reaching the measured criteria, rather than what the criteria is intended to 
measure (Holgersson, 2005, 2007; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2008). For example, one study 
investigated the Swedish police’ work to reduce alcohol-induced traffic accidents. It was 
found that measuring this work in number of controlled drivers lead to controls being 
conducted at times and places when drivers being intoxicated were unlikely, as the KPI only 
stressed number of controls (Woxholm et al., 2007). In Norway, studies of NPM effects are 
scarce. One relevant study is a 2012 master thesis targeting management by objectives in 
Hordaland police district (Valland, 2012). The study concludes that overarching goals, 
operational goals, and KPIs are too loosely connected, that the applied KPIs does not 
sufficiently cover the tasks of the police organization, and that the performance measurement 
system does not facilitate cooperation between organizational units. Although little research 
has been conducted on NPM in the Norwegian police, international findings about its effects 
has sparked a debate about applying further NPM measures in the planned quality reform of 
the police organization. Critique of NPM implementation in the Norwegian police service has 
mainly been directed at the implementation of the PSV system (NOU 2012:14; Politiets 
kriminalitetsforebyggende forum, 2013). Professor of police science at the Norwegian Police 
University College, Johannes Knutsson, recently directed criticism at the current KPIs used in 
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PSV to assess police performance (Knutsson, 2014). Two recent feature articles in the 
Norwegian financial newspaper Dagens Næringsliv also address the topic of NPM in the 
Norwegian police; Anne Lise Fimreite, professor of political science at the University of 
Bergen, cautions against the NPM approach to solving large, complex societal issues such as 
climate, health and national security. She points to fragmentation and conflicting demands on 
leaders as examples of negative consequences (Fimreite 2014). Shortly after, Roger 
Bjørnstad, chief economist at the political science analysis firm Samfunnsøkonomisk analyse, 
highlighted the incompatibility of NPM with the Norwegian work life model characterized by 
flexibility and negotiation. The article specifically mentioned the planned police reform, 
questioning the appropriateness of a NPM approach to quality improvement (Bjørnstad, 
2014).  
 
Scope and research question 
In sum, the results from previous research are inconclusive as to whether NPM results in 
the intended effectiveness and efficiency in public sector organizations. A line of research 
focusing not on organizational output, but on the effects on public service employees, has 
found many adverse effects of NPM techniques. Prominent among these are: 
- Role conflict and stress due to broadening of roles 
- Increased focus on measured criteria, at the expense of attention to ongoings and 
results which are not measured  
- Increased bureaucracy  
- Subcultures resisting the applied NPM measures 
- Counterproductive behavior 
This line of research is based largely on interviews, case studies and survey research. These 
studies suffers from some of the same methodological challenges as research on NPM’s effect 
on organizational results. It is hard to establish a baseline against which to compare the 
observed effects, and it can be difficult to establish what exactly caused the effects if there are 
several NPM reforms at play at the same time, as well as other ongoing organizational 
changes. The question of causality may be especially challenging when using interviews and 
surveys, as the informants may have established their own, possibly faulty, beliefs about 
causality and communicate these to the researcher. It also likely that the effects of NPM will 
vary between different countries, organizations and organizational levels. For instance, studies 
have showed that NPM reforms were much more critically regarded by those at middle and 
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lower levels of the organization, than by senior managers (Auditor General of Canada, 1993; 
Pollitt, 1995).  
Research questions.  The scope of this thesis is the effect of application of NPM 
techniques in the Norwegian police service. Due to the previously mentioned methodological 
issues related to evaluating the effect of NPM on organizational output, this study will focus 
on employees’ experience of implemented NPM measures. International research shows that 
as a part of the public sector, the police service is affected by NPM reforms. Studies have also 
found that the implementation of such reforms can stem from both an economic need for 
organizational effectiveness, and serve as a means to legitimize the organizations practices. It 
can be argued that the undesired effects of NPM is a more serious case for concern in the 
police than in other public service organizations, due to the nature and importance of police 
work. It is however not clear to what extent the documented effects are present in the 
Norwegian police. Detailed, centrally dictated targets, like those in the Norwegian PSV 
system, have been associated with restricted autonomy, inflexibility, goal distortion and data 
manipulation. Yet, NPM has been practiced more moderately in Norway than in countries 
such as UK, Australia and New Zealand, where much of the research on the topic has been 
conducted. It is therefore possible that the results from international studies do not apply to 
the Norwegian police service. As planned reforms in the Norwegian police service entail 
further implementation of NPM, this is an important time to assess the effects of NPM on 
police employees in a Norwegian context. This study aims to do so by exploring how the use 
of NPM techniques are perceived and described by the police employees themselves. The 
management tool PSV is chosen as an operationalization of NPM in the Norwegian police. 
The focus of the thesis can be divided into four research questions, or objectives. 
1. The first objective will be to systematize and describe the effects of KPIs and the PSV 
system on employees in the Norwegian police. The interview data will be analyzed, 
and the results presented both quantitatively and qualitatively.    
2. The second objective will be to investigate whether there are differences in how 
employees on different organizational levels experience the NPM measures. Based on 
existing research, it is expected that employees on higher levels with management 
responsibilities, will experience NPM differently than those without such 
responsibilities. It is assumed that higher level employees will experience more stress 
and role-conflict, and therefore potentially be more negative to NPM measures than 
lower level employees.  
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3. The third objective will be to compare the results of this study with previous research, 
discussing potential similarities and differences. It is expected that several of the same 
basic effects of NPM implementation found in other countries and organizations, also 
will be found in the Norwegian police. Norway has however had a different history in 
regard to NPM implementation than many other countries. On one hand, the 
incompatibilities between NPM and Norwegian public sector might make Norwegian 
public sector employees react more negatively to NPM than public sector employees 
in other countries. On the other hand, the same incompatibilities have lead to NPM 
measures being applied more moderately in the Norwegian public sector, which in 
turn may have reduced its potential negative effects. 
4. The fourth objective will be to make recommendations for the further use and 
development of PSV, based on the study’s results. It is expected that the results will 
not be compatible with all the planned measures for development of PSV and police 
management described by POD and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security’s 2013 
report. Given that the results of this study corresponds to previous findings, further 




The data collection was conducted over a four year period from 2009 to 2012, as part of 
an ongoing research projects lead by the research department of the Norwegian Police 
University College. The data material consists of 89 semi-structured interviews with police 
personnel from all of Norway’s 27 police districts. The informants are a strategic selection, 
representing three organizational level; level 1) investigator, level 2) crime investigation 
officer (hereafter CIO), and level 3) police chief. Table 2 shows the distribution of informants 
from the different organizational levels in each district. From each district, except one, at least 
one employee from each level was interviewed. One district was significantly larger than the 
others and is therefore represented by eight informants, while the other districts are 
represented by three or four.  
The informants were asked open-ended questions about their perception of the quality of 
criminal investigations in their district, phrased as follows: 
1. Describe what you today see as functioning well in the investigative work of this 
district. We call this the strength of the investigative work. 
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2. Describe what you today see as not functioning well in the investigative work of this 
district. We call this the weakness of the investigative work. 
3. Describe what you today see as opportunities to improve the quality of the 
investigative work of this district. We call this the opportunities of the investigative 
work. 
4. Describe what you today see as threats to improving the quality of the investigative 
work of this district. We call this the threats of the investigative work. 
The questions were based on the SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats) framework, a commonly known tool for strategic planning, typically used to evaluate 
business projects and ventures (Hill and Westbrook, 1997). The SWOT categories can be 
divided into positive and negative, strengths and opportunities being positive, and weaknesses 
and threats being negative. At the same time, strengths and weaknesses refer to the current 
situation, while opportunities and threats refer to the future. It is also common to divide the 
dimensions into internal and external factors, but this distinction was not made in this study. 
The SWOT structure was chosen because it encourages the informants to reflect upon many 
different aspects of the subject, whilst still allowing an open interview form. In addition to the 
four main questions, the interviewers used follow-up questions to make the informants clarify 
or elaborate upon previously mentioned topics. Care was taken by the interviewers not to 
introduce new topics through follow-up questions, as this could bias the data. Two 
interviewers were present for each interview. The main interviewer was the same each time, 






 The interviews were recorded, and later transcribed. The transcriptions are verbatim, 
including everything that is said during the interview, but not non-verbal communication such 
as gestures and facial expressions. Sounds such as laughter and coughing were also excluded. 
The transcribed interviews were then unitized, a process consisting of dividing whole 
interviews into smaller units of information. In the unitizing process, a unit, or statement, was 
defined as “a part of a sentence, a whole sentence, or several sentences expressed by the 
interviewee, that constitutes a coherent, meaningful point of view that describe an aspect of 
the work environment” (Hoff, Strausheim, Bjørkli & Bjørklund, 2009, p. 14). In total, the 
Table 2. Number of informants from the different organizational levels (N=89) 
Level 
Total 
1. Investigator 2. CIO 3. Police chief 
30 30 29 89 
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interview data consists of 18,929 units. The use of such small units allow for a high level of 
detail in data analysis. Each unit have been coded on the SWOT and IGLO frameworks. The 
IGLO model is a four-factor framework structurally similar to SWOT, separating between 
individual, group, leaders and organization. The average inter rater reliability for the coding 
on the SWOT and IGLO frameworks are 73.72% and 67.58%, respectively. All units are also 
coded on organizational level and police districts of the informant.  
  Limitations of the data. The informants represent a strategic selection of 
police employees from all police districts in Norway, and are therefore a suitable population 
for making inferences about the Norwegian police service as a whole. However, most 
informants, except for the police chiefs, mainly work with investigative police work. The 
population may therefore not be representative of police employees occupied with operative, 
rather than investigative, police work. Another issue concerning the representativeness of the 
data is that the interviews were conducted over a four year period. During this time, the police 
organization’s use of KPIs and PSV has been in continuous development. Therefore, it might 
be that the result do not reflect all aspects of the current situation in the Norwegian police.  
  
Procedure 
The data material is of considerable size, and contains information about many 
different topics. The first step of the analysis was therefore to identify the parts of the data 
material relevant to the study’s topic of PSV or KPIs. It was decided to assess each data unit 
individually, and select the relevant ones for analysis. The collection of data in some districts 
started prior to the implementation of PSV. Only including data referring specifically to this 
system would therefore exclude all data from these districts. As several of the KPIs from PSV 
was already in use prior to its implementation, it was decided to analyze all data referring to 
either the PSV system, or the use of KPIs in general without specific reference to PSV. The 
statements chosen for analysis were hence all those containing information about PSV or 
KPIs, including how it was applied, whether the informants’ considered it useful or not, and 
why. Through this process, a smaller dataset was identified for the next stages of analysis. 
This is the data set on which all further analyses was performed. 
 The thesis’ first objective is to describe and systematize the informants’ perception of 
PSV and KPIs. As the object was to convey the experience as perceived by the informants, a 
non-theory driven inductive qualitative analysis of the data was considered appropriate 
(Willig, 2008). The data set was subjected to a simplified version of content analysis as 
described by Braun and Clarke (2006). This method uses an bottom-up approach of reading 
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and re-reading the material whilst developing a list of underlying themes present in the data. 
The themes are continuously checked against the data, and refined, until one reaches 
saturation and no other or additional themes can be identified. The product of the analysis is a 
content model, or list of themes, describing the data material’s most prominent topics, and 
their frequencies. As previously research has already identified a set of topics relevant to 
public sector employees’ experience of NPM, an alternative approach could have been to use 
a top down analysis, simply checking the data for occurrences of these topics. However, this 
method does not identify possible new themes found in the data, and one therefore risks 
missing important information. A bottom-up approach was therefore considered more 
suitable.  
The second objective was to investigate whether there are differences in how 
employees on different organizational levels experience the NPM measures. This was done by 
cross-tabulating the informants’ organizational level with the content model developed in the 
previous stage of analysis, as well as both the SWOT and IGLO frameworks respectively. 
This generated an overview of the occurrence of the categories of the different models, sorted 
by the informants organizational level. Following the procedure described by Pallant (2007), 
chi-square tests were performed to control the statistical significance of the observed 
differences. In the data set, the information units vary in length, and whether the interviewer 
asked follow-up questions about a certain topic affects the number of units contain 
information on that topic. Because of this, the number of informants addressing a given topic 
was considered to might be more informative than the number of units addressing it. 
However, to achieve statistically significant results, it is desirable to have a larger population 
size than the number of informants in this study. This could however be achieved through 
analysis on unit level, as the number of units as far greater than that of informants. The 
between-group analysis for both content model, SWOT and IGLO were therefore performed 
at both informant and unit levels.  
The third objective was be to compare the results with previous research, and the 
fourth to make recommendations for the further use and development of PSV, based on the 
study’s results. These objectives are not approach through analysis per se, but are addressed in 









Occurrence of statements about KPIs and PSV 
55% of the informants in the original data set mention KPIs or PSV in their interviews. 
Only in three districts do no informants mention these topics. When analyzed by number of 
informants, there are no significant difference between the organizational levels in occurrence 
of statements about KPIs or PSV. However, when analyzed at a unit, rather than informant 
level, an effect is evident. As table 4 shows, although approximately as many informants from 
the different levels mention KPIs, the extent to which they talk about KPIs or PSV varies 





 Thematic bottom-up analysis conducted for this study resulted in a content model 
consisting of nine themes, or topics, related to the use of KPIs in the Norwegian police. These 
are shown in table 5. Each of the content categories are describes in further detail below, 
illustrated with example statements from the interviews representing each category. Appendix 
B shows the original quotes in Norwegian. 
Table 3. Total number of informants from the different organizational levels, compared 
to number of informants from different organizational levels mentioning KPIs or PSV 
 Level  
 1. Investigator 2. CIO 3. Police chief Total 
Total 30 30 29 89 
Mentioning KPIs* 16 18 15 49 
 
Table 4. Number of statements about KPIs or PSV from each organizational level 
(N=785) 
Level Frequency Percent 
1. Investigator 136* 17% 
2. CIO 247* 32% 
3. Police chief 402* 51% 
*Significant difference between levels 1 and 2 (p<.01), 1 and 3 (p<.01), and 2 and 3 
(p<.01) 




*The sum of informants exceeds 49 because most informants mention more than one theme. 
**The sum of percentages exceeds 100% because most informant mention more than one 
theme. 
 
1. Measurement criteria. Discussed by 53% of the informants who mention PSV, the 
measurement criteria is one of the most predominant themes in the data material. This refers 
to statements about the choice of KPIs, and how they are operationalized and measured. One 
reoccurring issue is the time limit for completion of cases. Several informant point out that it 
is problematic to keep within the time frame on cases requiring DNA analysis, as the waiting 
list for an analysis can be as long as nine months.  
«So we hope we don’t get a case, a case with a deadline, where for example a knife 
has been used, so that we have to do a DNA analysis. Then your KPIs goes out the 
window right away.» 
 
A consequence of this is, according to the informants, lowered motivation and reduced 
incentive to prioritize cases requiring DNA analysis.  
 Several informants discuss whether the measurement criteria correspond to what they 
perceive as quality in investigative work. It seems to be the general opinion among the 
informants mentioning the measurement criteria, that today’s KPIs are insufficient in 
capturing what constitutes “high quality policework”. This is, according to the informants, 
because PSV focuses on what is easily quantifiable and measurable, rather than what truly 
defines quality. It is pointed out that serious and highly prioritized cases such as murder and 
sexual offences, often are complex. Therefore, the quality of investigations in such cases are 
especially prone to be misrepresented by the use of simple measurement criteria, such as those 
in PSV. 








1 Measurement criteria 26 53% 
2 Communication with upper management 20 41% 
3 Too much focus on KPIs 18 37% 
4 Prioritizing the wrong cases 15 31% 
5 Benefits  15 31% 
6 Strain 12 24% 
7 Cooperation between districts 8 16% 
8 Counterproductive or unethical behavior 8 16% 
9 Procedure 36 73% 
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“It’s very difficult to measure for example sexual offences. You can of course measure 
case processing time, you can measure percentage of cases solved, but it’s not a given 
that this says anything about how good the investigation has been.” 
 
“I think that POD through their KPIs have chosen to do what Colonel Arne Pran once 
said, that when what is important cannot be measured, one makes what can be 
measured important.” 
 
Although several point out that not all important aspects of investigative work are in fact 
measurable, the informants who express discontent with the current PSV often suggest 
alternative ways to operationalize and measure police work. Among the suggestions are 
separate KPIs for different types of criminality, to prevent prioritizing of cases that are “easy” 
to solve in order to reach KPIs. This could entail allowing for longer time spent on complex, 
time-consuming cases than on simpler ones. Informants point out that using measurement 
criteria that capture the actual amount of work and effort put into a case, rather than just the 
number of days from start to finish, would be both more motivating and a better 
representation of performance. Many suggest improvement by the use of more qualitative 
measures. For instance, instead of just counting the number of controlled vehicles, one should 
document what the control entailed; why was the car stopped, what was the result of the 
control? This prevents meaningless use of resources by stopping vehicles for no purpose other 
than to obtain the KPI. 
«It’s decided that this many vehicles are to be controlled each year. And it’s almost like, 
you can potentially just wave them in, and let them drive on, and then you’ve controlled 
one.» 
 
«I’m thinking that maybe we should work with traffic in a different way, instead of 
standing by the roadside stopping Granny on her way to the co-op to buy milk, and maybe 
stop her on the way home just to make sure, and then you have two controlled [drivers]. 
(…) That doesn’t do the police any good.» 
 
Other suggestions include adding KPIs for crime prevention, and incorporating a 
prognosis function into PSV, to enable better planning. Also, several informants express that 
they want KPIs to be more open to be adapted locally, to better reflect the crime levels and 
focus areas of the different districts. 
 
2. Communication with upper management. This theme refers to the 
communication between the police districts and the upper management, on matters related to 
PSV. ‘Upper management’ typically refers to POD, but can also point to The Director of 
Public Prosecutions, government or other organs the police take directions from. Mentioned 
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by 41% of the informants, this is a commonly occurring theme in the data set. When talking 
about communication with upper management, many mention the procedures for following up 
PSV results. It is pointed out by several informants that there is a lack of consequences or 
response from POD both when a district fails to meet KPIs, and when they perform better 
than what is expected.  
«And it’s that lacking, somewhat lacking, handling of consequences that I think the 
management should be challenged more on. That is, what products one delivers. (…) 
That there’s an openness to being held accountable in a slightly different way.» 
 
«It’s something to think about that you’re not rewarded for the big, serious organized 
crime cases, in what the police chief is held accountable for at the dialogue meeting 
with POD.” 
 
Yet other informants are satisfied with the dialogue with POD, and feel that they are 
given adequate guidance, although the responsibility for reaching KPIs ultimately lies with 
the district itself.  
«Then we had to go home and do our homework again in some areas, after the 
dialogue with the management last fall. And we thought that was fine, because that’s 
the point of having a management dialogue. That they don’t just sit there and nod and 
say “Until next time” and go home, but that they actually started to point out whether 
it was in keeping with the trend report.» 
 
 Another recurring aspect of this theme is the fact that the police districts are given 
directions by several organs on how to prioritize, and that these directions are reflected in 
PSV. These directions does not always coincide, and they are often not specific enough, 
resulting in a larger number of prioritized areas than the districts are able to manage. Several 
informants express a wish for fewer prioritized areas, as they do not have the resources to 
focus on all the priorities defined by PSV.   
 
«I perceive POD and Director of Public Prosecutions to be on somewhat different 
tracks, considering what demands they have.» 
 
«They think that we should prioritize everything that’s criminal, but you can’t do 
everything. You have to choose.» 
 
 Others express a wish for less upper management control and more autonomy in 
deciding what areas to prioritize in ones own district. This is related to the statements under 
the theme measurement criteria about locally adapted KPIs. Another recurring issue when 
talking about communication with upper management about PSV, is resources. Several 
informants stress the importance of aligning resource allocation with the KPIs and prioritized 
areas.  
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 «There really is a connection between management and leadership and resources and 
people. That connection is there. If you dare to lead and be clearer on how you 
manage your resources according to the prioritized goals.» 
 
3. Too much focus on KPIs. 37% of the informants talk about an excessive focus on 
KPIs, at the expense of the quality of the investigative work. Many express worry for the 
tendency to hurry the investigation to meet the time criteria, as it increases the risk of not 
investigating the case thoroughly enough.  
«I’ve seen enough examples of police districts in the media proclaiming «the case was 
solved in twenty-four hours». And I know that in several of these cases, one has 
overlooked important things that should have been further investigated, simply because 
one’s been so set on running it through quickly».  
 
«What I see in smaller places, is that they can have many, three thousand, theft cases that 
they’ve gotten through the system quickly2, and then they’re measured on that. And then 
assaults, general assaults against adults, are poorly investigated. Because it’s the 
numbers that count. I think that’s entirely wrong.» 
 
It is emphasized by several informants that retaining quality in their work requires the ability 
to at times ignore KPIs.  
«I think it’s important to have the ability to look away from these numbers when it 
comes to investigation. We, we mustn’t become so ‘Yes, now we have to hurry and get 
it done like this and that, because we’ll be measured soon’.» 
 
This theme is linked to the previously discussed theme of measurement criteria, as it 
seems that the informant link the use of quantitative KPIs are to the shift in focus away from 
the quality of the investigative work.  
 
 4. Prioritizing the wrong cases. This theme is mentioned by 31% of informants. The 
theme is related to measurement criteria, but focuses on how the criteria facilitates 
prioritizing, rather than what the informants think about the criteria per se. Several informants 
say that less serious, routine cases are prioritized over more serious crimes, because that is 
most beneficial to reach the PSV indicators. There is a concern that PSV facilitates a 
prioritizing of cases that does not coincide with what cases the informants perceive as more 
important.   
«I feel that, to me, that they come, that domestic violence cases come second to these 
bar fight cases, I think that’s very wrong.» 
 
                                                
2Cases such as theft are often routinely closed without investigation. Prioritizing such cases over cases that 
require investigation therefore allows a district to process and a large number of cases quickly (Knutsson, 2014). 
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It is also pointed out that when PSV encourages focus on specific targeted areas, such as 
violent offences, the investigative work on other areas suffers.  
«It’s the wrong cases that you constantly have on these statistics. Like here, 
aggravated assault, they are prioritized, and they are highly prioritized, but for a 
while only that was important. Sexual offences were neglected because assaults had to 
be investigated.» 
 
 5. Benefits. Although many of the statements about PSV are critiques of the system, 
31% of informants also emphasize the benefits and positive outcomes of KPIs. Several talk 
about PSV’s potential as a tool for monitoring one’s own performance. This enables the 
district to evaluate their work, thereby improving future performance.    
«Reporting deviations isn’t for singling out individuals, but for learning. It’s a 
learning process. That we, reporting deviations on any little thing, that may seem like 
a bagatelle, but if we, if we do that, it contributes to making us better.» 
  
«And then this is typed into PSV, so that when, we see what the goals are, and then it’s 
finding the right approaches and measures, and then we do that for a while, and then 
we see after a while if it has worked. ‘No, this didn’t work’ – then we have to go back 
and see ‘Should we do something different?’.» 
  
Others point to KPIs as helpful to ensure effectiveness, as it gives investigators 
incentive to complete cases on time. KPIs are also described as a way of improving quality by 
holding the police accountable for their results. Benefits of PSV as a goal setting system is 
also mentioned.  
«We have an understanding that, that PSV is a management tool. It’s a good control 
tool, also for team leaders and the head of section, to see whether we’re on our way to 
reach the goals we have, that the police chief has set.» 
 
Several of the informants who express discontent with aspects of PSV say that they 
recognize the use of KPIs as necessary. It seems that they do not object to the use of KPIs in 
general, but rather criticize specific aspects of PSV.  
As mentioned under communication with upper management, the police operate on 
basis of a large set of directions from several different organs. One informant point to the fact 
that PSV provides a useful way to summarize all these instructions, so that they are 
manageable and easily available to police personnel on all organizational levels.  
«PSV has given us a manageable overview of our goals. Our tasks are clearly 
defined.» 
 
Another mentioned benefit of PSV is that it facilitates analysis of the crime situation in 
the district, making the police work more knowledge based.  
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«At least for the last couple of years, our work has been organized according to trends 
and analysis and criminal, or situational analysis. We are more knowledge driven 
than we were before. Our goals are set on a completely different basis now than they 
were a few years ago.» 
 
 6. Strain. 24 % of the informants mention stress or strain caused by the use of PSV. 
Included in this theme, is increased pressure and responsibility or change in roles caused by 
the use of KPIs. It is mentioned by several that centrally dictated targets and pressure to report 
on results restrict autonomy for investigators, and thereby is harmful to motivation and work 
environment on lower organizational levels.  
«I think there are too many centrally dictated directions that put an unnecessary 
pressure on investigators.» 
 
Informants state that the role of the middle managers includes managing the amount of such 
pressure their subordinates are put under. It is pointed out that the pressure from upper 
management should mainly fall on the middle managers, but that pressure must also be 
applied to subordinates in order to lead and give directions.  
«That pressure should be on the head of section and middle managers.» 
 
It is stated that the middle manager role has been expanded to include more administrative 
tasks, and that the added responsibilities for reporting results are time-consuming. It is also 
said that there is a lack of support for middle managers.  
«It has become so much, that’s it not done in a flash, answering all these reports, 
writing all these feedback reports, doing all the controls in PSV, in PAL, you name it. 
And still be a good leader.» 
 
«As a middle manager, you often feel alone.» 
 
 7. Cooperation between districts. The interview data shows that 16 % of informants 
perceive PSV to influence the cooperation between police districts. The general opinion of the 
informants talking about this is that separate KPIs for the different districts can be an obstacle 
when cooperating across district borders. Informants link this to the fact that different districts 
have different focus areas and budgets, and report results separately, as this gives less 
incentive for the districts to assist each other.  
«We aren’t able to cooperate across police districts, because we are seven units that 
function almost like benchmarking with regard to KPIs. (…) We’re not interested in 
lending personnel to other units if it’s not a case that affects my goals.» 
 
Several informants point out that they are less willing to use resources on cases in other 
districts because PSV only measures the results obtained in one’s own district.  
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«There are some [instances], and especially where the goals work 
counterproductively, as in the case of using resources in neighboring districts, so 
that’s unfortunate.» 
 
To reduce this effect, one informants suggests expanding PSV to include KPIs for number of 
cases cooperated on with other districts.  
 
 8. Counterproductive or unethical behavior. 16 % of informants talking about KPIs 
mention counterproductive or unethical behavior resulting from the use of such measures. 
One example of such behavior is to register a case as “offender unknown”, instead of sending 
DNA evidence for analysis, because to wait for the laboratory results will cause the 
investigation to exceed its PSV time limit. Others talk about falsely coding or duplicating 
cases in order to meet KPIs. Informants also mention a tendency to “strategically” choose 
which cases to investigate, depending on what will have the desired effect on PSV results.  
«We see that some districts stops with primary cases, and duplicate and have an 
extreme focus on what generates numbers, short processing time and a high 
percentage of [solved] cases.» 
 
«These statistics and stuff, they can easily be manipulated, and I think that occurs too. 
To reach the numbers (…), or please those higher up in the system.» 
 
 9. Procedure. 73% of the informants mention procedures related to the use of PSV. 
Statements in this category describe PSV itself, or practical procedures and routines for using 
the tool.  
«It’s on reduction of theft, it’s on how many assaults you have, it’s on the time it takes 
to close a case, and percentage of cases solved.» 
 
The category also includes statement about how the informant’s evaluate his/her or other 
districts’ performance on PSV, when the statement does not contain evaluation of PSV itself.  
«We have good results on PSV, we perform well on the KPIs.» 
 
Organizational level differences 
Content model. The data from the content analysis was analyzed by organizational 
level, to investigate whether informants employed at different levels were concerned with the 
same issues.  Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. Table 7 shows the same analysis, 
conducted at unit rather than informant level. Hence, table 6 shows how many informants on 
the different levels mention a given topic, while table 7 shows for how many statements they 
talk about it. Focus is on categories 1 through 8 of the content model, excluding the category 
Procedure. Statements in this category describe PSV itself, or practical procedures and 
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routines for using the tool. However, it does not contain information about how the 
informants evaluate PSV or these procedures. Statements in the Procedures category are 
hence related to KPIs, and were therefore included in the first stage analysis (tables 3, 4 and 
5), which only assessed the extent to which KPIs were mentioned by informants. In this stage 
of analysis, however, where the goal is to describe the informants’ evaluation of KPIs, this 
category is not useful, because it does not contain such information. For the further stages of 
analysis, this category is therefore treated as belonging to the Residual category, and hence 
excluded from analysis. Residuals are however included in the calculations. This means that 
the percentages of informants or statements referring to a given theme on either the content 
model, SWOT or IGLO, is assessed based on the total number of informants or units, 
residuals included. 
 
Table 6. Percentage of informants (N=49) on different organizational levels 
mentioning the content model categories  
 
 Level  
Content model category 1 (N=16) 2 (N=18) 3 (N=15) 
Total 
(N=49) 
1. Measurement criteria 63% 39% 60% 53% 
2. Communication with upper 
management* 
19% 39% 67% 41% 
3. Too much focus on KPIs 44% 33% 33% 37% 
4. Prioritizing the wrong cases** 38% 44% 7% 31% 
5. Benefits  13% 33% 47% 31% 
6. Strain 13% 28% 33% 24% 
7. Cooperation with other districts 19% 11% 20% 16% 
8. Counterproductive or unethical behavior 32% 11% 7% 16% 
*Significant difference between levels 1 and 3 (p<.05) 
** Significant difference between levels 1 and 3 (p<.05), and 2 and 3 (p<.05) 
  




Table 7. Percentage of statements (N=785) from informants on different organizational levels 
mentioning the content model categories 
 Level  
Content model category 1 (N=136) 2 (N=247) 3 (N=402) 
Total 
(N=785) 
1. Measurement criteria 23%  19% 17% 15% 
2. Communication with upper management* 16% 13% 20% 17% 
3. Too much focus on KPIs** 12% 6% 2% 5% 
4. Prioritizing the wrong cases*** 8% 8% 0%3 4% 
5. Benefits**** 3% 8% 20% 13% 
6. Strain***** 3% 6% 2% 3% 
7. Cooperation with other districts 4% 2% 2% 3% 
8. Counterproductive or unethical 
behavior****** 
7% 2% 2% 3% 
*Significant difference between levels 2 and 3 (p<.05) 
** Significant difference between levels 1 and 3 (p<.01), and 2 and 3 (p<.01) 
***Significant difference between levels 1 and 3 (p<.01), and 2 and 3 (p<.01) 
****Significant difference between levels 1 and 2 (p<.05), 1 and 3 (p<.01), and 2 and 3 (p<.01) 
***** Significant difference between levels 2 and 3 (p<.01) 
****** Significant difference between levels 1 and 2 (p<.05), and 1 and 3 (p<.01) 
 
In table 6, the number of informants mentioning the different themes appears to be 
similar across organizational levels for several categories of the content model. The number 
of informants from each level is roughly the same for measurement criteria, too much focus 
on KPIs, and cooperation with other districts. In several of the categories, however, there are 
significant differences. The CIO police chiefs seem to be more concerned with 
communication with upper management, than the investigators The difference between 
investigators and police chiefs is statistically significant (p<.05). Investigators and CIO 
mention prioritizing the wrong cases significantly more often than police chiefs do (p<.05).  
Higher level employees talk about the benefits of PSV of KPIs more often than those on lower 
levels. Significantly more police chiefs than investigators (p<.05) and CIOs (p<.05) mention 
benefits. More CIOs and police chiefs than investigators talk about strain caused by KPIs. 
Also, counterproductive or unethical behavior is mentioned more often by investigators than 
by employees on the higher organizational levels.  
                                                
3 0.2%, rounded down to 0% 
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Table 7 shows most of the same tendencies as table 6. Because the number of units is 
far higher than that of informants, this analysis yields more results that are statistically 
significant. First, police chiefs make significantly fewer statements about the topic of too 
much focus on KPIs (p<.01). The number of statements about communication with upper 
management is significantly higher for police chiefs than for CIOs (p<.05). As for prioritizing 
the wrong cases, police chiefs make significantly fewer statements (p<.01). In the category 
benefits, investigators make significantly fewer statements than both CIOs (p<.05) and police 
chiefs (p<.01), and police chiefs make significantly more statements than CIOs (p<.01). CIOs 
make more statements related to strain than do police chiefs (p<.01). Lastly, investigators talk 
more about counterproductive or unethical behavior than CIOs (p<.05) and police chiefs do 
(p<.01). 
SWOT. Differences in the perception of KPIs between employees on different 
organizational levels were as also analyzed by use of the SWOT model. All interview data is 
coded on the SWOT model categories strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. How 
many informants make statements that are coded as each of these, is shown in table 8. Table 9 
shows the number of units belonging to each SWOT category. In table 8, there are few 
differences between both organizational levels and total number of informants mentioning the 
different SWOT categories.  
 
Table 8. Percentage of informants (N=49) on different organizational levels 
mentioning the SWOT categories 
 Level  
SWOT category 1 (N=16) 2 (N=18) 3 (N=15) Total (N=49) 
Strengths* 44% 56% 93% 63% 
Weaknesses 75% 78% 73% 76% 
Opportunities 56% 72% 67% 65% 
Threats 69% 61% 53% 61% 
* Significant difference between levels 1 and 3 (p<.05) and 2 and 3 (p<.05) 
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Table 9. Percentage of statements (N=785) from informants on different 
organizational levels coded as the SWOT categories 
 Level  
SWOT category 1 (N=136) 2 (N=247) 3 (N=402) 
Total* 
(N=785) 
Strengths** 16% 28% 36% 30% 
Weaknesses 29% 27% 21% 24% 
Opportunities 18% 18% 19% 37% 
Threats*** 32% 18% 9% 32% 
*Significant difference between strengths and weaknesses (p<.05), strengths 
and opportunities (p<.01), strengths and threats (p<.01), weaknesses and 
opportunities (p<.01), and weaknesses and threats (p<.01). 
**Significant difference between levels 1 and 2 (p<.01), 1 and 3 (p<.01), and 2 
and 3 (p<.05). 
***Significant difference between levels 1 and 2 (p<.01), 1 and 3 (p<.01), and 2 
and 3 (p<.01). 
 
The only statistically significant difference on the informant level analysis in table 8 is 
that police chiefs mention more strengths than investigators (p<.05) and CIOs (p<.05). 
Organizational level differences are more prominent in table 9. This table, illustrating analysis 
on unit level, shows that investigators mention fewer strengths than both CIOs (p<.05) and 
police chiefs (p<.05). Police chiefs also talk about strengths significantly more than CIOs 
(p<.05). The category threats show the opposite tendency, with higher occurrences on lower 
organizational levels. The number of statements in this category is significantly higher for 
investigators than for both CIOs (p<.01) and police chiefs (p<.01). Police chiefs also make 
significantly fewer statements about threats than CIOs (p<.01).  
In addition to differences between the different organizational levels, there are also 
differences in the occurrence of the different SWOT categories in table 9. There are 
significantly more statements coded as strengths, than as weaknesses (p<.05), opportunities 
(p<.01) and threats (p<.01). There are also significantly more statements about weaknesses 
than opportunities (p<.01) and threats (p<.01). Combined, this means that there are 
significantly more statements about the present state (strengths and weaknesses) than about 
the future (opportunities and threats).  
 IGLO. Following the same procedure as for the SWOT analysis, the data was also 
analyzed by the IGLO model. This framework sorts statements by which aspect of the 
organization they refer to; individual, group, leader or organization.  




Table 10. Percentage of informants (N=49) on different organizational levels 
mentioning the IGLO categories 
 Level  
IGLO category 1 (N=16) 2 (N=18) 3 (N=15) Total* 
Individual 19% 22% 33% 24% 
Group 19% 28% 20% 22%  
Leader 63% 61% 67% 63% 
Organization 88% 94% 93% 92% 
*Significant difference between individual and leader (p<.01), individual and 
organization (p<.01), group and leader (p<.01), group and organization (p<.01), 
and organization and leader (p<.01) 
 
Table 11. Percentage of statements (N=785) from informants on different 
organizational levels coded as the IGLO categories 
 Level  
IGLO category 1 (N=136) 2 (N=247) 3 (N=402) 
Total* 
(N=785) 
Individual** 3% 2% 8% 5% 
Group 4% 7% 4% 4% 
Leader*** 19% 34% 22% 25% 
Organization**** 74% 60% 57% 61% 
*Significant difference between individual and leader (p<.01), individual and 
organization (p<.01), group and leader (p<.01), group and organization (p<.01), and 
organization and leader (p<.01) 
**Significant difference between levels 2 and 3 (p<.01) 
***Significant difference between levels 1 and 2 (p<.01), and 2 and 3 (p<.01) 
****Significant difference between levels 1 and 2 (p<.01), and 1 and 3 (p<.01) 
 
Table 10 shows the results by number of informants, and table 11 by number of units. 
The informant level analysis (table 10) shows no significant differences between the different 
organizational levels. However, in total, there is a difference in occurrence of the different 
IGLO categories. Significantly fewer informants make statements in the individual category 
than about leader (p<.01) and organization (p<.01). There are also fewer informants 
mentioning group than leader (p<.01) and organization (p<.01), and more informants 
mentioning organization than leader (p<.01).  
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 The unit level analysis in table 11 show the same differences between the IGLO 
categories as those in table 10, with organization occurring significantly more often than 
individual (p<.01), group (p<.01) and leader (p<.01), and leader more often than individual 
(p<.01) and group (p<.01). This analysis also shows differences between organizational levels 
within the IGLO categories. Police chiefs make significantly more statements related to 
individual than do investigation leaders (p<.01). As for statements referring to leader, 
investigators make fewer statements than investigation leaders (p<.01), and investigation 
leaders fewer statements than police chiefs (p<.01). Investigators also make significantly 




Prevalence of statements about PSV and KPIs 
The results show that 55% of the informants in the original dataset (N=89) mention 
KPIs or PSV when interviewed about strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in the 
investigative work in their district. Only in three of 27 districts do no informants mention it. It 
is uncertain why. There are differences in when, and how rigorously, PSV was implemented 
in the different districts. It may be that the districts from which no one mentions performance 
management was using this management technique to a lesser extent than other districts at the 
time the interviews were conducted. The number of informants from each district is 
considered too small to be reliable for a district-level analysis of the data. That open-ended 
questions result in such a high prevalence of statements about this topic, indicates that PSV 
and KPIs are indeed perceived as an important factor effecting the work of police employees. 
 
Organizational level differences on the content model 
For the analyses on both informant and unit level, the number of informants 
mentioning the different themes is different across organizational levels for several categories 
of the content model. The number of informants or units from each level are roughly the same 
for measurement criteria and cooperation with other districts. In the remaining categories, 
differences were revealed.   
Too much focus on KPIs. The unit level analysis found significantly fewer statements 
from police chiefs (p<.01), than the other organizational levels on this topic. This category of 
the content model largely refers to KPIs taking time and focus away from investigations and 
practical police work. As it is mainly investigators and CIOs who are charged with the actual 
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practical investigative work, it makes sense that they are more aware of focus being shifted 
away from these tasks. In addition, administrative tasks like managing KPIs may culturally or 
traditionally be perceived as a more natural part of the police chief’s role, thereby making 
police chiefs tolerate far more focus on KPIs before they consider it “too much”.  
Communication with upper management. For communication with upper management, 
the informant level analysis found significant differences between investigators and police 
chiefs (p<.05), and the unit level analysis between police chiefs and CIOs (p<.05). The 
tendency is that higher level employees have a higher representation in this category. This is 
perhaps not surprising, as “upper management” in the content model mainly refers to the 
Director of Public Prosecutions and POD – bodies which investigators have little contact 
with. Hence, it is not unexpected that higher-level employees talk more about the 
communication with upper management, because they engage in it more often than employees 
on lower levels. 
Prioritizing the wrong cases. Investigators and CIOs mention prioritizing the wrong 
cases significantly more often than police chiefs do, in both the informant and unit level 
analyses (p<.05 and p<.01 respectively). This may be due to the fact that they are closer to the 
actual investigative work and therefore are more aware of how cases are prioritized. This can 
be related to the differences in too much focus on KPIs, which might also be attributed to 
closeness to practical investigative tasks. 
Benefits. CIOs and police chiefs talk about the benefits of PSV of KPIs more often 
than investigators do. The informant level analysis showed significantly more police chiefs 
talking about benefits (p<.05), and the unit level analysis showed fewer statements on this 
topic from investigators, than from both CIOs (p<.05) and police chiefs (p<.01). The content 
analysis shows that the benefits typically mentioned are related to self-monitoring and 
strategy. These are largely managerial issues, and it can therefore be expected that these 
topics occur less often in interviews with lower level employees, whom to lesser extent 
experience these benefits in their daily work. 
Strain. Another difference between organizational levels occur in the category strain. 
The informant level analysis indicated that more higher-level employees mention this, but the 
differences are not statistically significant. The unit level analysis however, shows significant 
differences. There are significantly more statements on this topic from CIOs than from police 
chiefs (p<.01). That employees with management responsibility would be more represented in 
this category, was expected. This is concurrent with the research literature, and might have to 
do with the fact that it is employees on higher levels who experience the most role 
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broadening, and thereby added pressure, by the implementation of NPM measures. According 
to the same research, one would expect police chiefs, who have a mid-level manager role, to 
be more affected by this than CIOs. That CIOs have the highest occurring number of units 
relating to this topic is therefore a surprise. However, there is no significant difference 
between the organizational levels on the informant level analyses.  
Counterproductive or unethical behavior. In both analyses, mentioning of 
counterproductive or unethical behavior occur less often in interviews with investigators than 
with employees on the higher organizational levels. The results are not statistically significant 
in the informant level analysis. In the unit level analysis, however, result are significant for 
the difference both between investigators and CIOs (p<.05), and between investigators and 
police chiefs (p<.01). An explanation for this finding might be that the behaviors described in 
this category of the content model is mostly conducted, and therefore mostly known, by 
lower-level employees.  
 
SWOT analysis 
 Differences between organizational levels. Compared to the content model, the 
SWOT analysis shows relatively few differences between the different organizational levels. 
The informant level analysis show that significantly fewer investigators (p<.05) and CIOs 
(p<.05) than police chiefs make statements coded on the SWOT model as strengths. The unit 
level analysis indicate the same, with investigators uttering fewer statements in the strength 
category than both CIOs (p<.05) and police chiefs (p<.05). Police chiefs also make more 
strength statements than CIOs (p<.05). The same analysis shows an opposite tendency in the 
threats category, with more statements from investigators than from the CIOs (p<.05) and 
police chiefs (p<.05). This echoes the tendencies found in the content model analysis. Here, 
investigators were overrepresented in the categories too much focus on KPIs, prioritizing the 
wrong cases and counterproductive or unethical behavior – all of which can be described as 
threats to the police’s investigative work. Investigators were also underrepresented in the 
category benefits, which contains statements likely to be codes as strengths on the SWOT 
framework. Hence, the SWOT and content model analyses give a similar depiction of the 
differences between the organizational levels. That the content model seems to capture the 
same tendencies as the more established SWOT framework, can be said to support the 
model’s validity. 
 It is noteworthy that higher-level employees did not talk significantly more about the 
future, i.e. opportunities and threats, than employees on lower organizational levels. A police 
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chief’s job is more concerned with matters such as planning and strategy, than that of for 
instance an investigator. Therefore, one would perhaps expect police chiefs to be more 
concerned with the future state than the investigators are, and for this to be reflected in the 
interview data. However, the results shows no such effect.  
 Differences on the SWOT framework. Apart from differences between 
organizational levels, the analysis shows differences in the occurrence of the different SWOT 
categories. The unit level analysis shows that significantly more statements are strengths, than 
weaknesses (p<.05), opportunities (p<.01) and threats (p<.01). This supports the finding from 
the content analysis, that although critical, informants are not categorically opposed to KPIs 
and do recognize beneficial outcomes of using PSV. Yet, as the content analysis uncovers 
mostly disadvantages of KPIs, it is unexpected that statements coded as strengths would have 
a significantly higher occurrence than all other SWOT categories. This particular finding may 
however be somewhat confounded by the fact that police chiefs, who have a larger total 
number of units about KPIs, are overrepresented in the strengths category. This might make 
the total number of strengths higher than it would have been, had all organizational levels 
been represented by equally many statements.  
 
IGLO analysis 
 Differences between organizational levels. The informant level IGLO analysis show 
no significant differences between the organizational levels, with roughly the same number of 
informants from each level mentioning each IGLO category. In the unit level analysis, some 
differences emerge. Police chiefs make significantly more statements related to individual 
than CIOs (p<.01) do. A possible explanation for this is that employees on higher levels, i.e. 
police chiefs, experience more autonomy in the use of KPIs and PSV, and hence based on 
their own perspective regard it as an issue more closely related to the individual employee. 
Police chiefs also make more statements than CIOs (p<.01) about on the leader category. 
Investigators make fewer leader statements than CIOs (p<.01). It may be that the importance 
of leadership in relation to the use of KPIs is perceived as more important to those who 
themselves have leadership functions, or who are closer to the organization leaders. Hence, 
this finding can perhaps be explained by the same mechanisms as the tendency shown in the 
in the content analysis, for higher-level employees to be more concerned with communication 
with upper management. In contrast, results also show that investigators talk more about 
organization than both CIOs (p<.01) and police chiefs (p<.01) do. This can indicate a 
fundamental difference in how higher and lower-level employees perceive the use of KPIs, 
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with those on higher organizational levels viewing it more as a matter of leadership and 
individual effort, and those on lower levels seeing it as more dependent on the organization as 
a whole.   
 Differences on the IGLO framework. Both the individual and unit level analyses 
show the same differences in occurrence of the IGLO categories. Both analyses found that 
organization occurred significantly more often than individual (p<.01), group (p<.01) and 
leader (p<.01), and leader occurred more often than individual (p<.01) and group (p<.01). 
Hence, organization can be said to be recognized as the most important aspect related to 
PKIs, across organizational levels. The second most occurring category is leader. These two 
occur far more often than group and individual, indicating that individual and group are seen 
as less relevant to the use and success of KPIs. A possible consequence of this is that 
measures directed at the use of PSV should be concentrated at the organization as a whole, 
rather than groups and individuals. 
  
Comparison with previous research 
International research on the effect of NPM techniques on public service employees, point 
to several adverse effects. As previously mentioned, the most commonly found are: 
- Role conflict and stress due to broadening of roles 
- Increased focus on measured criteria, at the expense of attention to ongoings and 
results which are not measured  
- Increased bureaucracy  
- Subcultures resisting the applied NPM measures 
- Counterproductive behavior 
A comparison of these effects and results of this study, reveal many similarities. Role conflict 
and stress due to broadening of roles has been found in several previous studies (Butterfield et 
al., 2005; Woodall, Edwards, & Welchman, 2002). These effects are also found here, and are 
presented in the category strain in the content model. Increased focus on measurement 
criteria, at the expense of attention to ongoings and results which are not measured, is also a 
main theme in the interview data, found in categories too much focus on KPIs, and to some 
extent prioritizing the wrong cases. This echoes the findings of previous research on NPM in 
the police in (Butterfield et al., 2005; Holgersson, 2005, 2007; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2008; 
Lapsely, 2009; Woxholm et al., 2007). For instance, the findings about the KPI on number of 
controlled drivers is parallel to those on a similar measure in the Swedish police in a 2007 
study (Woxholm et al.). Occurrences of counterproductive behavior is also a documented 
MEASURING POLICE PERFORMANCE  
41 
 
effect of NPM implementation (Campbell, 2008; Butterfield et al., 2005; Holgersson & 
Knutsson, 2008; Lapsely, 2009; Woxholm et al., 2007). The result of this study shows similar 
tendencies, covered by the category counterproductive or unethical behavior.  
The results of the SWOT and content model analyses indicate that investigators have a 
less positive perception of PSV than employees on higher levels. This can be interpreted as a 
sign of resistance against NPM measures among organizational subcultures, as has been found 
in previous studies (Butterfield et al., 2005; Kitchener et al., 2000). It is also in keeping with 
previous studies that have found senior managers to be generally less critical of NPM reforms 
than employees on lower organizational levels (Auditor General of Canada, 1993; Pollitt, 
1995). Increased bureaucracy is a known potential effect of NPM (Butterfield et al., 2005). 
This did however not occur as a theme of the content model developed in this study. There 
were statements mentioning the issue, but they were far too few for it to be considered a main 
theme. “Increased bureaucracy” is however a wide description that captures a range of effects 
and behaviors. Themes such as too much focus on KPIs, cooperation with other districts and 
procedure all contain descriptions of what can be labeled as increased bureaucracy, although 
the informants do not explicitly describe it as that. Therefore, although this study does not 
identify increased bureaucracy as a main theme in the informants’ perception of PSV, it does 
not propose that this phenomenon is not present.  
 The content model also describes themes not commonly found in previous research on 
NPM. These are communication with upper management, benefits, and cooperation with 
other districts. Out of those talking about KPIs or PSV, 41% of the informants mention 
communication with management on higher organizational levels, which indicates that this 
factor is important to the use and evaluation of KPIs. It is however, a prerequisite for, rather 
than a consequence of NPM implementation. Thus, it is given that this category in the content 
model differ from what previous research has identified as main effects of NPM techniques. 
This study found that many, especially police chiefs, perceive PSV as beneficial, and 
appreciates it as a means to better control and plan the districts’ operations. This s not a 
commonly found effect of NM reform in previous research, although one study found similar 
effects among middle managers in the British National Health Service (Currie and Procter, 
2002). Given that existing research has rarely found such positive effects, it was surprising 
that the content analysis of the data in this study revealed benefits of KPIs to be a commonly 
occurring theme, mentioned by 31% of the informants talking about KPIs. This finding is 
important, as it indicates that the informants do not object to the concept of KPIs itself, but 
rather criticize specific aspects of PSV and its implementation and use. It is however 
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important to note that benefits of NPM measures were perceived differently by employees on 
different levels, the police chiefs being significantly more attuned to benefits in their 
interviews. The content model found that the use of PSV caused problems in between-district 
cooperation. As mentioned, this can to some extent be attributed to increased bureaucracy, but 
by far in its entirety. That NPM techniques have adverse effects on cooperation between 
different organizational units and districts, is a finding that has not been addressed by much 
previous research. It does however coincide with the findings from the previously mentioned 
2012 study of performance measurement in Hordaland police district (Valland, 2012). This 
strengthens the conclusion that the current PSV system does in fact hinders between-district 
cooperation in the Norwegian police.  
As previous research has shown that especially middle-managers are affected by NPM 
implementation, it was expected that more informants on higher organizational levels would 
mention KPIs or PSV. However, there were no significant differences between organizational 
levels concerning the number of informants mentioning these topics. This indicates that NPM 
reforms affect employees on all organizational levels. Yet, when analyzed by units, 
informants on higher levels are shown to talk significantly more about KPIs and PSV, 
supporting the hypothesis that these issues are especially important to higher-level employees. 
  
Foundation of NPM 
The results of this and other studies all indicate that there are negative side effects 
related to the use of NPM. A possible explanation for this may lie in NPM’s theoretical 
foundation – or rather, lack thereof. As previously pointed out, NPM is not a single, theory 
driven management ideology, but rather a collective term for a set of management techniques 
that gained popularity in the 1980’s (Gruening, 2001). NPM strategy draws on several earlier 
traditions from the organizational and administrative sciences, but lacks an underlying 
theoretical framework to support it. As a result, NPM consists of techniques and paradigms 
out of which some are inconsistent, or even conflicting (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001; Hood, 
1991). NPM also stands out from other management traditions in that it does not formulate a 
clear perspective on the social and interpersonal aspects of organizational life. The lack of a 
unison theoretical perspective on management might to some extent be the reason why NPM, 
although popular, seems not to have been successful in achieving its intended goals of 
organizational effectiveness. Similarly, from an employee perspective, the perceived negative 
effects of NPM may be related to the fact that this form of management does not take social 
and interpersonal aspects of work life and organizations into account. 




Implications for the further development of PSV 
 The findings of this study may have implications for the use of NPM measures in the 
Norwegian Police, and especially for the further development of the PSV system. Based on 
the study’s results, the following recommendations are made: 
- Revise measurement criteria. One important finding is that police employees on all 
organizational levels included in the study are concerned with how police performance 
is operationalized and measured through PSV. The current measurement criteria 
appears to have been decided through a combination of tradition, convenience and 
politics. The KPIs should be a representation of what constitutes quality in police 
work, but it appears that some of the current KPIs of PSV are not perceived as such. A 
revision of the measurement criteria is therefore advised. The revision should be 
knowledge based and take a scientific approach to establishing criteria for defining 
police performance. Employees at all organizational levels should be included in the 
revision process. This recommendation concurs with the plans to revise KPIs 
suggested by both POD and the committee behind the 2013 police report (NOU 
2013:9). It is important that the KPIs not only capture important organizational goals 
and tasks, but that they are operational and can be measured properly. 
- Improve communication between upper management and lower-level employees. The 
results clearly indicate that there are significant differences in how employees on 
different organizational levels perceive PSV and its use. Results show that upper level 
employees who are more in contact with upper management are more aware of the 
strengths and benefits of PSV, while employees on lower levels are more aware of the 
systems negative effects on investigative work. This point to two target issues for 
improved communication between upper management and lower level employees: 
1. Improve the lower-level employees understanding of PSV’s purpose and 
uses.  
2. Get feedback from lower-level employees on the practical application and 
adverse effects of PSV.  
A better understanding of the purpose and strategy behind PSV will hopefully enable 
the lower level employees to better utilize the system, and be more aware of its 
benefits. The opportunity to give management feedback on PSV might also improve 
their perception of the system, as it leads to increased autonomy. This is also in 
keeping with the Norwegian work life model principle of employee participation, as 
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stipulated by the Norwegian Working Environment Act, (Arbeidsmiljøloven, 2005). In 
addition, feedback from employees on the PSV’s functioning is essential to the 
management for the improvement and further development the system, as discussed 
above. POD has expressed increasing the employees’ awareness of PSV’s properties 
and function as part of the planned future development of PSV. Improving 
communication with lower-level employees serves to contribute to this. 
- Promote focus on tasks, not numbers. An important finding in this study was that 
reporting KPIs leads to an increased focus on numbers, at the expense of investigative 
tasks. This is a serious threat to the police work, especially as it is revealed that 
employees have been known to engage in unethical behavior and manipulation of 
numbers, due to the excess focus on KPIs. To counter this effect, it should be clearly 
communicated to all organizational levels that the main focus of the organization 
should be the completion of tasks, not the reporting of KPIs. This is related to the 
recommendation above, about increased communication between upper management 
and employees. Conveying the purpose of PSV as a tool for self-monitoring and 
learning, rather than a mere score board, may reduce the excessive focus on reaching 
KPIs. This, in turn, will hopefully reduce the incentive to engage in unethical or 
counterproductive behavior to achieve “green numbers”. Promoting focus on tasks 
rather than numbers does however have implications for the use of PSV as basis for a 
reward system. This issue is addressed below.  
- Exercise caution in implementing reward systems based on PSV results. The report by 
the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (NOU 2013:9) proposes increased use of 
reward systems based on achievement of organizational results. Specifically, the 
report states that there should be consequences for leaders who fail to reach the 
organizations defined goals, expecting this form of performance management to 
increase organizational performance. Based on the results of this study, there is reason 
to believe that such an approach could seriously worsen the adverse effects of NPM 
present today. Punishing failure to achieve KPIs is likely to enforce the already 
existing culture of excessive focus on numbers at the expense of quality in the 
investigative work. This may in turn lead to an increase in unethical behavior and 
untruthful reporting of results. In addition, results indicate that the current KPIs of the 
PSV may not sufficiently operationalize quality in police work. Enforcing 
performance on the PSV measurement criteria may therefore not mean enforcing good 
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police work. This thesis hence strongly cautions against using PSV in its present form 
as the basis for an organizational reward system.  
  
Limitations 
 The population contains informants from all of Norway’s 27 police districts, and can 
therefore be considered representative for the Norwegian police force as a whole. This 
strengthens the generalizability of the results. As mentioned, the data was collected over a 
period of four years, from 2009 to 2012. The use of KPIs and PSV has been in continuous 
development during and after this period, and it may therefore be that the result do not fully 
reflect the current situation in the police. However, the development has been in the direction 
of more, not less, use of KPIs and PSV. The opinions expressed by informants about these 
issues are therefore still highly relevant to the current situation.  
The underlying assumption for the thematic analysis is that topics mentioned more 
often are either more prevalent in the investigative work, or of more importance to the 
subjects interviewed. These results only hold up to the extent this assumptions is correct. A 
threat to the content model’s validity is hence that the most frequently recurring themes are 
not those of greatest perceived importance to the informants, but those that are easiest to 
verbalize. For instance, this may explain why a broad concept such as increased bureaucracy 
did not emerge as a main theme in the interviews, even though it is commonly known as a 
typical effect of NPM measures. This content model is therefore not proposed as an 
exhaustive list of all effects of NPM implementation, but rather a summary of the most 
prominent effects as described by the employees themselves. Further studies may identify 
additional, or other, themes than those described here. Another potential limitation with 
interviews as a data collection method is that the informants may have their own agendas in 
the interview, answering in a fashion they expect to result in a beneficial outcome. The 
motivation for this can for example be to portray one-self in a socially desirable manner, or to 
prompt desired changes in the workplace. In addition to willful manipulation of answers, 
informants may not be aware of the reasons for their opinions and preferences. For example, it 
could be argued that the police employees’ expressed resistance to NPM implementation can 
in part be attributed to general resistance to change, and not NPM in itself.  
Before analyzing the data, a list of themes likely to occur in the data had already been 
identified, through studies of previous research. It is likely that this may have biased the 
bottom-up analysis in the sense that the analysis was entered with a preexisting idea of what 
themes might emerge. However, the purpose of using a bottom-up analysis rather than a top-
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down in this case, was the possibility of discovering new themes not identified by previous 
research. As the aim was this, rather than formulating a theory, the analysis’ validity is not 
considered to be compromised by the study of previous research. Even so, interpretation and 
analysis of qualitative data is an inherently subjective process that will necessarily be biased 
by the researcher’s own preexisting knowledge, attitudes and frame of reference. This may be 
especially true when analyzing verbatimly transcribed interview data, as all non-verbal 
communication is lost. A certain level of subjectivity on part of the researcher is unavoidable, 
but it has been attempted to make the analytic process transparent by the use of example 
statements from the interviews to validate the presented conclusions. However, the interview 
data is in Norwegian, and it is possible that information is lost, or even added, in the English 
translations of data presented in the analysis. For the sake of transparency the original 
statements in Norwegian are therefore submitted in appendix B. The grade of subjectivity in 
the thematic analysis could also be assessed through the estimation of inter-rater reliability. 
This would be an interesting topic for further studies, and would contribute to establish the 
content models validity. 
The scope of the thesis limits the study to the exploration of effects of PSV and KPIs 
as described by police employees themselves. This means that the study has not addressed the 
effects on objective measures for organizational output or results. The data can therefore not 
be used to conclude on how the use of PSV and KPIs effects performance, but rather how 
police men and women at different organizational levels perceive it to effect theirs 
performance, daily work life and professional role. Investigating the effects of PSV on 
objectively measured organizational performance would be methodologically difficult, as the 
best objective measure of police performance available at this time is PSV itself. Targeting 
the perceived effect on PSV on employees can therefore be argued to be a scientifically viable 
approach to evaluating PSV.  
 
  




 The results indicate that the effects of NPM implementation on employees in the 
Norwegian police resemble the effects previously found in international studies. Such effects 
include excessive focus on numbers at the expense of the quality of the work, strain on the 
employees caused by added pressure and role broadening, and employees engaging in 
counterproductive or unethical behavior in order to reach KPIs. The police employees do 
however recognize benefits and positive outcomes of the use of KPI reporting systems, 
although they are critical of specific aspects of it. Analyses show that there are differences in 
the perception of PSV between employees on different levels of the organizations. Generally, 
employees on lower levels are more concerned with the adverse effects of PSV, while those 
on higher levels are more oriented towards its benefits. The findings lead to four 
recommendations for the further development of the PSV KPI system. 
1. Revise measurement criteria. Establish KPIs that are measurable, and that capture 
the important organizational goals and tasks of the police service. 
2. Improve communication between upper management and lower-level employees. 
This can contribute to improving the lower-level employees understanding of PSV’s 
purpose and uses, as well as allowing management to receive feedback on the 
application and effects of PSV.  
3. Promote focus on task, not numbers. Shifting focus away from just KPIs will 
hopefully reduce the employees’ incentive to engage in unethical or counterproductive 
behavior to achieve KPI goals. 
4. Exercise caution in implementing reward systems based on PSV results. Using PSV 
in its present form as the basis for an organizational reward system might seriously 
worsen the adverse side effects documented in this and previous studies. 
In sum, this thesis concludes that the use of NPM techniques in the Norwegian police is 
perceived by the employees to have several negative, and in some cases serious, effects on the 
police’ investigative work. It is advised that management take these effects under careful 
consideration before implementing further NPM based measures in the police organization. 
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Quotes from content analysis in Norwegian 
Measuremet criteria 
«Så vi håper jo da at vi ikke får en sak, en fristsak hvor det er snakk om bruk av for eksempel 
kniv så vi må foreta en DNA analyse. Så da ryker måltallet ditt med en gang» 
«Det er veldig vanskelig å gi mål på for eksempel sedelighetssaker, man kan selvfølgelig måle 
saksbehandlingstid, man kan måle oppklaringsprosent, men det er ikke dermed gitt at det sier 
noe om hvor god etterforskningen er.» 
«Jeg synes det at POD gjennom sine måltall har valgt å gjøre det som Oberst Arne Pran i sin 
tid sa at når det viktige ikke lar seg måle gjør man det som kan måles viktig.» 
«Man fastsetter at så så mange bilførere skal kontrolleres hvert år. Og det er nesten en sånn, 
du kan potensielt bare vinke dem inn og la dem kjøre videre, og dermed har du kontrollert 
én.» 
«Jeg tenker at vi kanskje burde ha jobba med trafikk på en annen måte i stedet for å stå på 
langstrekker og stoppe Bestemor når hun skal på Coop’en og kjøpe melk, og kanskje stoppe 
hun på veien hjem også for sikkerhets skyld, så har man to kontrollerte. Det gjør ingenting 
godt for politiet, for å si det sånn.» 
Communication with upper management 
«Og det er den manglende litt manglende konsekvenshåndteringen synes jeg at det 
lederskapet må utfordres mer, altså, på hva en leverer av produktene sine. (…) At det må 
være mer åpenhet for at vi blir liksom ansvarliggjort på en litt annen måte.» 
«Så det er et tankekors i forhold til at du blir jo ikke honorert på de store alvorlige 
organiserte kriminalsakene på det som politimesteren skal svare på i drøftingsmøtet med 
POD.» 
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«Så vi måtte hjem og gjøre leksa litt om igjen på noen områder etter styringsdialogen i fjor 
høst, og det syns vi var helt greit, for det er jo vitsen med å ha styringsdialog. At de ikke bare 
sitter inne og nikker og sier ‘Takk for nå’ også reiser hjem, men at de faktisk begynte å peke 
litt på om det var helt i tråd med trendrapporten» 
«Jeg oppfatter det at POD og Riksadvokaten er litt på forskjellig kurs med tanke på på hvilke 
krav de stiller.» 
«De mener at vi skal prioritere alt som er straffbart, men man kan jo ikke spise alle de 
kamelene som finnes rundt omkring. Man må velge noe.» 
«Det er faktisk en sammenheng mellom styring og ledelse og ressurser og folk. Den 
sammenhengen er der. Hvis du våger å styre og være mye tydeligere på hvordan du styrer 
ressursene inn i det prioriterte målbilde.» 
Too much focus on KPIs 
«Jeg har sett nok av eksempler på politidistrikt som har stått frem i media og slått seg på 
brystet og sagt ‘Saken pådømt i løpet av fireogtyve timer’. Og jeg vet om flere av disse 
tilfellene så har man da oversett vesentlige ting som burde ha vært undersøkt videre, rett og 
slett for da har man vært så opptatt av og kjøre dette her igjennom med hurtig fart.» 
«Det ser jeg på ute på de mindre stedene at det at de kan ha mange tre tusen vinningssaker 
som de har fått igjennom systemet så kjapt, så måles de på det, og så ligger voldssakene, altså 
de generelle voldssakene mot voksne, og blir dårlig etterforsket. For det at det er tallene som 
teller. Og det synes jeg er helt feil.» 
«Jeg tror det er viktig å kunne ha evnen til å kunne se litt bort i fra disse tallene når det 
gjelder etterforskningen. Vi må ikke bli så ‘Ja, nå må vi forte oss og få avgjort sånn og sånn 
og sånn. For nå er det snart ny avlesning av tallrekken’.» 
 
 
MEASURING POLICE PERFORMANCE  
56 
 
Prioritizing the wrong cases 
«Jeg føler at for meg så er det at de kommer, at familievoldssakene kommer bak de her slåss-
på-byen-sakene, det synes jeg er det er feil for meg da.» 
«Det er feil saker som, altså man har hele tiden denne statistikken sånn som her 
legemsbeskadigelser, de skal prioriteres og de skal prioriteres veldig høyt, men det var jo en 
stund så var det jo bare det som var viktig. Voldtektssaker ble liggende fordi legemssaker de 
måtte bli etterforsket.» 
Benefits 
«Avviksmeldinger er ikke for å henge enkeltpersoner, men for å lære. Læringsprosess er det. 
Det at vi, det å skrive avviksmeldinger for en hvilken som helst liten ting, kalt for filleting 
kanskje hos oss, men hvis vi, hvis vi driver sånne ting er det med og gjøre oss bedre.» 
«Og så legges dette inni PSV sånn at når man vi ser hva som er målene, og så er det noe med 
å finne de rette tiltakene og virkemidlene og så gjør vi det en stund og så ser vi om en stund 
om dette har virka. ‘Nei, dette virka ikke’ – da må vi gå tilbake å se ‘Skal vi gjøre noe 
annet?’.» 
«Vi har en forståelse for at det er et styringsverktøy det med PSV. Og at det er en godt 
kontrollverktøy også for teamledere og seksjonsleder for å se at vi er på vei til å nå de målene 
vi har, politimester har satt.» 
«PSV har gitt oss et overkommelig målbilde. Det er klart definert hva vi skal gjøre for noe.» 
«Siste par åra i hvert fall så har jo arbeidet vårt vært lagt opp mer og mer i tråd med med 
trend- og analyse- og kriminalitets-, altså situasjonsbeskrivelse. Vi er mer kunnskapsstyrte 
enn vi var før. Målene våre settes jo på mye på et helt annet grunnlag nå enn de gjorde for 
noen år tilbake.» 
 
 




«Jeg synes det er for mye for mye sentrale føringer som legger et sånt unødvendig press 
egentlig, på etterforskerne.» 
«Det presset skal være på seksjonsleder og mellomleder.» 
«Det er blitt så mye etter hvert at det er liksom ikke gjort på et øyeblikk å svare på alle de 
rapportene, skrive alle disse tilbakemeldingene, føre alle disse kontrollene med PSV med, med 
PAL, med you name it, og samtidig være en god leder.» 
«Man føler seg alene som mellomleder mange ganger.» 
Cooperation between districts  
«Så klarer vi ikke samhandle på tvers av politidistriktene, fordi vi er syv driftsenheter som 
fungerer, nesten som benchmarking i forhold til sine måltall. (…) Vi er ikke interessert i å 
avgi personell til andre driftsenheter hvis ikke det er en sak som berører mitt målområde» 
«Det jo noen sånne og særlig der målene virker direkte kontraproduktivt da, som det gjør i 
forhold til det å bruke ressurser i nabodistriktet for eksempel, så er det jo uheldig.» 
Counterproductive or unethical behavior 
«Vi opplever at en del distrikter de tar seg jo til rette her med førsteleddsaker og dupliserer 
og har et voldsomt fokus på det som gir tall, kort saksbehandlingstid og høy saksprosent.» 
«Dette med statistikker og sånne ting, det kan lett fjuskes med, og det tror jeg det blir gjort og. 
Å få tilfredsstilt de tallene, de som skal, eller, de lengre opp i systemet.» 
Procedure 
«Det går på reduksjon av vinning. det går på hvor mange voldssaker du har, det går på 
saksbehandlingstid, og oppklaringsprosent.» 
«Vi har gode PSV resultater, vi holder måltallene våre bra.» 
 
 
 
 
